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FOREWORD—A STUDENT SYMPOSIUM ON NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS

Joshua Silverstein*
In June of 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB v. Sebelius”).1 The
case addressed the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”),2 which enacted wide-ranging changes to
the American health care system. Health care reform is one of the most
substantively important and politically salient issues in American public life.
And the legal challenges to the Affordable Care Act implicated fundamental
aspects of our constitutional structure, including the limits of Federal power,
the nature of state sovereignty, individual liberty, and interpretive methodology. As a result, NFIB v. Sebelius was the most closely followed Supreme
Court case since Bush v. Gore. It captured the imagination of the public and
inspired an extraordinary amount of commentary in the build up to the decision. Given the political and legal importance of the issues addressed in the
case, the editors of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
and I concluded that NFIB v. Sebelius merits substantial attention in the
pages of the review.
In addition to being significant, the constitutional issues that the Supreme Court adjudicated in NFIB v. Sebelius are complicated. And there are
many such issues. The case thus does not lend itself to traditional student
scholarship. It is simply too long in length and too broad in scope for a single student note or comment.3 Accordingly, I proposed that the Law Review
conduct a written student symposium on NFIB v. Sebelius, with each student
piece tackling one of the difficult questions raised in the case.4 The editors
accepted my recommendation, and the results are set forth in this volume of
the review.
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School
of Law. B.A. 1993, Hamilton College. J.D. 1996, New York University School of Law.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of titles 5,
18, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28–31, 35, 36, and 42 of the United States Code).
3. For example, the various opinions in the case took up a total of 112 pages of West’s
Supreme Court Reporter. The decision runs from page 2566 of volume 132 through page
2677.
4. My thanks to David Schlesinger of Jacobs & Schlesinger LLP, located in San Diego,
California, for assistance in developing the idea of a student symposium on NFIB v. Sebelius.
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The symposium starts with “The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act: A Constitutional Analysis,” by David Jung. This article serves as
an introduction to, and background for, the remaining pieces. Jung begins
with a political history of health care reform in the United States, covering
the period from the early twentieth century up through the adoption of the
Affordable Care Act. He then presents an overview of the statute. Next,
Jung discusses the procedural history of the constitutional challenges to the
act in the lower courts. Finally, Jung summarizes the various Supreme
Court opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius. He sets forth all of the pertinent rulings
as well as the arguments of the concurring and dissenting justices.
The second piece in the symposium, by Josie Richardson, is entitled
“Let Them Eat . . . Broccoli?” Richardson analyzes the Supreme Court’s
ruling that the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The mandate is a requirement
that all citizens either purchase health insurance or pay a “penalty.”5 As
Richardson explains, the Court concluded that the Commerce power extends
only to the regulation of existing commercial activity. It does not cover the
failure to act; Congress may not use the Commerce Clause to regulate mere
inactivity. Compelling a person to engage in a commercial transaction, such
as by mandating that the person buy health insurance, is the regulation of
inactivity. Thus, it is beyond the authority conferred by the Commerce
Clause.
NFIB v. Sebelius is only the third Supreme Court opinion since the
New Deal to find that an act of Congress exceeded the limits of the commerce power. That might lead one to conclude that the decision significantly altered Commerce Clause jurisprudence. But Richardson persuasively
argues otherwise. In fact, she concludes that the law “essentially remains
unchanged.” Most importantly, Richardson explains that the individual
mandate is unique. Congress had never before attempted to force individuals to enter into commercial transactions with other private parties. Finding
that something so novel is beyond Congress’s commerce power says very
little about either the vast bulk of legislation on the books or statutes likely
to be proposed in the future.
The astute reader will note that I did not describe the Court’s conclusion with respect to the Commerce Clause as a “holding.” That is because
there is some dispute as to whether the ruling was necessary to the Court’s
ultimate judgment that the individual mandate was a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing power. And that question turns, in part, on whether Chief
Justice Roberts properly used the canon of constitutional avoidance in his
opinion for the Court. This is the topic of the next article in the symposium,

5. See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. V 2012).
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“Avoiding the Unavoidable: The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance as Applied to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” by T.J. Fosko.
The canon of constitutional avoidance provides that courts should interpret a statute in such a way as to avoid raising constitutional questions
when the language of the statute is susceptible to such a reading. More specifically, as between two interpretations of a law, one that makes the law
constitutional and another that makes it unconstitutional, courts should
adopt the former unless that understanding is clearly inconsistent with Congressional intent. In NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts used the canon
in holding that the payment a person must make if they choose not to buy
health insurance is a tax rather than a penalty. He reasoned that if the payment constitutes a penalty, it is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s
commerce power; but if the payment is a tax, it is a constitutional exercise
of Congress’s taxing power. And so the Chief Justice adopted the latter
reading.
The potential problem here is that, under the modern understanding of
the canon of constitutional avoidance, the canon is about avoiding constitutional questions. But Chief Justice Roberts did not avoid the constitutional
question implicating the Commerce Clause; he addressed it in full. Why?
According to Fosko, it is because the Chief Justice relied on precedents that
applied the older, classical version of the canon of constitutional avoidance—a version which requires that the Court resolve the constitutional
question at issue on the merits. Moreover, Roberts used those precedents to
craft a new canon that addresses the unique circumstances of NFIB v.
Sebelius.
The Supreme Court struck down only one aspect of the Affordable
Care Act—the provisions conditioning the states’ existing Medicaid funding
on their adoption of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. The
Court held that Congress lacked the power to impose such a condition under
the Spending Clause of the Constitution. This is the subject of the final
piece in the symposium, “Breaking Down the Supreme Court’s Spending
Clause Ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius: A Huge Blow to the Federal Government or a Mere Bump in the Road?” by Ellen Howard.
Congress may use its spending power to provide incentives for states to
take certain actions, such as by conditioning the receipt of federal funds.
But the Constitution prohibits Congress from coercing the states into action
via spending conditions. Howard explains that the Sebelius Court adopted a
new test for determining whether such a condition coerces the states: Congressional action is coercive if it conditions “significant” funding on the
adoption of an “independent” program. The Medicaid expansion condition
met both prongs of the test. First, the Medicaid funding that Congress provides to the states under pre-Affordable Care Act law is significant. Second,
the Medicaid expansion that the states were required to adopt in order to
keep their pre-Affordable Care Act funding was a separate, independent
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program, despite Congress’s use of the label “Medicaid.” Accordingly, the
condition was coercive and beyond Congress’s spending power.
NFIB v. Sebelius is the first time in American history that the Supreme
Court held that Congress exceeded the powers conferred by the Spending
Clause. However, as with the Commerce Clause, the ultimate impact of this
ruling is likely to be quite small. Howard forcefully demonstrates that the
vast majority of Congress’s spending conditions are not coercive under the
new test. She establishes this by showing that three important conditional
spending programs—those enacted by (1) the No Child Left Behind Act, (2)
the Clean Air Act, and (3) “Megan’s Law”—survive application of the new
constitutional framework. What distinguishes the Affordable Care Act is
the sheer size of Medicaid. No other Federal spending program has anywhere near the impact on the states that Medicaid does. In other words, like
the individual mandate, Medicaid is unique. Therefore, the constitutional
infirmity of the Medicaid expansion condition says very little about other
existing programs or about those Congress is likely adopt down the line.
The common themes running through the three substantive articles in
the symposium are this: NFIB v. Sebelius raised issues that are critically
important on legal and political grounds, but the ultimate holdings and supporting reasoning did not significantly change American constitutional law.
The Federal Government’s power to regulate under the Commerce and
Spending Clauses is largely intact. Striking down the Medicaid condition
and ruling that the individual mandate exceeds the commerce power are best
understood as minor adjustments made at the outer boundaries of federal
authority, not dramatic changes to our constitutional order. And since most
legislation is well within the scope of federal power, NFIB v. Sebelius’s
impact will be rather limited. Finally, Chief Justice Roberts’s new understanding of the constitutional avoidance canon reflects not a radical innovation, but a cautious extension of long-established precedents.
I would like to thank the authors of the four symposium pieces, their
faculty advisors, and the editors and board of the University of Arkansas at
Little Rock Law Review for their work in bringing this written symposium
to fruition. I hope that the readers of the Law Review get as much out of the
four symposium pieces as I did.

